The role of private health insurance (PHI) 
Background
The private health insurance system in Australia is unusual and possibly unique. It is neither a self-contained system, as in much of the US where managed care organisations have responsibility for all 'core' health care services for members. Nor is it purely supplemental like the Canadian system where private health insurance is confined to 'non-core' health care services, those not covered by the universal health scheme. Rather, in Australia, private insurance is both supplemental to and a substitute for universal cover -with individuals able to opt in and out of the publicly funded system, whenever they choose. Also unique is the level of government support for private health insurance, alongside publicly funded universal health cover.
The role of PHI has not been comprehensively reassessed since the introduction of universal health cover gave Australians free access to public hospitals and free or subsidised access to medical and pharmaceutical services. Universal cover was available temporarily under Medibank (1975) , and reintroduced in 1984 under Medicare, resulting ultimately in bipartisan support for universal health cover, in recognition of widespread community support. The role of private health insurance is undoubtedly different in the context of universal health cover compared with the situation in which free access to a hospital bed is restricted to eligible low-income individuals, as was the case prior to 1984 (except briefly under Medibank). Prior to 1984, in the absence of universal cover, a range of policies were introduced to improve affordability of PHI and private hospitals. These have included subsidies on private hospital bed-days, community rating of private health insurance, government subsidy to a reinsurance pool for high-risk claims (and the elderly) and a 32% tax rebate on public hospital ('basic') cover.
In recent years new policies have been introduced to support PHI, in response to falling PHI membership, despite this fall being a logical consequence of universal cover. These policies can be judged in terms of their capacity to achieve their purported objectives and for their impact on the efficiency and equity of the Australian Health care system. This paper presents an analysis of the evidence which suggests that the recent policies have served to undermine rather than promote the efficiency and equity of Australia's health care system.
Policies to promote PHI
Current policies to promote PHI are described fully elsewhere (see Butler 2002 , Willcox 2001 . In short they consist of:
i) an open-ended 30% rebate on private health insurance premiums for hospital and ancillary cover introduced December 31 1998 (replacing a means-tested dollar-limited rebate introduced on July 1 1997).
ii) exemption from the 1% Medicare surcharge on high income earners (which applies to single tax-payers with taxable incomes of $50,000 or more, and families/couples with a taxable income of >$100,000) for those who purchase 'eligible' private health insurance, introduced in December 1998. (The effect of this policy is that high-income households can be financially worse if they do not take up PHI, a substantial incentive for enrolment by this group.)
iii) an adjustment to community rating of PHI premiums, imposing a penalty on those who take out insurance after they reach 30 years of age, at the rate of 2% pa to a maximum loading of 40%, applicable to those joining after July 1 2000 (known as 'life-time rating').
iv) an aggressive publicly-funded publicity campaign promoting PHI membership, coinciding with the change to community rating (Deeble 2003) .
Impact of policies on PHI membership
Statistics published by the Private Health Insurance Administration Council (www.PHIAC.gov.au) demonstrate that the combined effect of these initiatives has been a large increase in PHI membership. The pattern of membership is reported in Table 1 and illustrated in Figure 1 . A modest increase in membership occurred in response to the extension of the PHI rebate and exemption from the Medicare levy surcharge -from 5.68 million persons at Dec 31 1998 (30.1% of the population) to 6.12 million persons by March 31 2000 (32.3% of the population). This was followed by a much larger increase in membership to 8.71 million persons (44.9% of the population) with the change in life-time rating and the aggressive publicity campaign promoting PHI membership. (For a more detailed analysis of the pattern of PHI membership, and the key influences, see Butler 2002.) In seeking to understand the longer-term changes in PHI membership it is necessary to distinguish two types of cover available prior to 1996, namely the 'Supplementary' and 'Basic' tables. The Basic Over the entire period, due to increases in premiums and population growth, the dollar value of private health insurance premiums and hospital benefits paid by funds continued to increase. This is why, despite what appears as a massive fall in private health insurance cover over several decades, the use of private hospitals has continued to grow, and often at a faster rate than public hospitals. 3. Change to life-time community rating for those joining after July 1 2000 plus aggressive publicity campaign.
Cost of policies to promote PHI membership
The large increase in private health insurance membership has been at high cost to the tax-payer.
The estimated cost of the policies to support PHI was approximately $2,500 million in 2001-02, without including any allowance for the effect of the exemption from the Medicare tax surcharge. This is made up of:
• $2,110 million in funding the 30% rebate in 2001-02 as reported by the AIHW (2003, Table 17 , prelim estimate).
• $410 million in extra Medicare payments to cover additional medical and pharmaceutical services associated with higher private hospital use. This is equivalent to 3.5% of Commonwealth expenditure on medical and pharmaceutical services (Dr John Deeble NCEPH, unpublished research).
The impact of the exemption from the Medicare surcharge is estimated at between $760 million to $1,100 million in taxation revenue forgone (Butler 2002 , Smith 2000 . This amount has not been included above in line with the stated intention of the surcharge, which was to provide an incentive for high income earners to join PHI, rather than to raise revenue through collecting the surcharge (Wooldridge 1996) . Other analysts (eg Butler 2002 , Smith 2000 have taken the alternative view, and treated it as a legitimate component of a progressive tax system. This level of public subsidy for private health insurance, and indirectly to private hospitals and private medical and other health professional service providers, represents a massive industry subsidy. The net operating margin of private hospitals has directly benefited, with a turn-around of declining margins (ABS 2002b). Based on a notional allocation of the 30% rebate to reflect benefit payments and other expenses of the health insurance funds (which must ultimately be translated into premiums), some 60% of the rebate, or around $1,260 million, supported hospital services (~30% of $4,380 million, see Table 2 ) and some $555 million supported services covered under ancillary tables, (~30% of $1,925 million, see table 4 ). An estimated $255 million was contributed to management costs and profit of the private health insurance funds (at ~13% of contribution income) (PHIAC 2003b) . Furthermore, of the estimated $1,250 million subsidy on hospital services, some $150 million went to support medical incomes, with nearly half of this on payments above the schedule fee (see Table 2 ). (Numbers are approximate and have been adjusted to equal the estimated subsidy).
The cost of the subsidy at over $2,500 million is also high relative to Commonwealth funding of public hospitals, which in 2000-01 was $7,125 million (AIHW 2002b, Table 25 ). The various incentives to support PHI are equivalent to 35% of the Commonwealth contribution to public hospitals, or 50% if the imputed revenue foregone through the tax surcharge is included.
While these policies have been successful in increasing private health insurance membership, it has not been demonstrated that this has generated a net community benefit. On the contrary, several studies suggest it to be wasteful, inefficient and inequitable (Duckett and Jackson 2000 , Hall et al 1999 , Deeble 2003 , Wilcox 2001 , Smith 2001 , Butler 2002 . In the remainder of this paper much of this evidence is drawn together and with new material is used to assess the overall performance of the policies.
Benefits of Private Health Insurance
Government assistance for private health insurance reflects concern about affordability and membership levels. The community interest underlying this concern is not self evident, but is generally expressed in terms of i) 'taking pressure off public hospitals' (by diverting demand from public to private hospitals); ii) 'providing citizens/patients with choice of insurer', 'ensuring a viable private health industry' and iii) 'reversing the withdrawal of private funds from the health system to curtail the increasing and unsustainable burden on the public purse'. These ideas are expressed in various public documents and speeches. For example Dr Wooldridge, Minister for Heath commented that 'for the first time in 13 years there is a Federal Government that understands that the long-term viability of Medicare depends on a stronger private health insurance industry and having more people covered for private hospital treatment' (Wooldridge 1997 
I. Impact on demand for public hospital services
The evidence concerning the impact of private health insurance membership on public hospital demand is still being gathered. The limited evidence (see for instance Hanning 2002 , Cromwell 2002 , Deeble 2002 , suggests that the policies have been largely ineffective and inefficient as a means of taking pressure off the public hospital system. The size of the possible redirection of demand can be observed most directly in the data on benefits paid by health insurance funds for acute care, as reported by PHIAC (2003a and 2003b) -see Table 2 below. The increase in benefits paid for hospital care, adjusted for trend growth in benefit payments, inflation and transfer payments, provides an indication of the possible size of any demand shift from the public to private hospitals associated with the growth in PHI membership. . This means at best a 'saving' of $1 from the public hospital system for each $4 spent on the rebate. The estimate is not inconsistent with research by Hanning (2002) , who estimated a potential reduction in elective surgery cases from public hospitals (relative to a 1989-90 baseline) of 7.6%, given that elective surgery is where the greatest redirection is expected.
But even this will overstate the possible reduction in demand from public hospitals, as it is necessary to adjust for increased levels of servicing with PHI membership, due to supplier-induced demand and moral hazard, phenomena observed under fee-for-service payment systems in the context of 3rd party payment. The likely impact may be large, based on a study by Robertson and Richardson (2000) , who report procedure rates after heart attack at 2 to 3 times higher for privately insured patients, compared with public patients. This means that any increase in funding and use of private hospital services will not equate with a reduction in the use of public hospital facilities.
In short, the available evidence, while limited, suggests that the large increase in PHI membership has been associated with only a small redirection in demand from public to private hospital services. This is not surprising:
• Firstly, many privately insured patients will continue to use public hospitals, as they are entitled to under Medicare. Private hospitals do not offer a complete hospital service, and even where equivalent services are available, persons with private health insurance have an incentive to use public hospitals, not divulging their insurance status, to avoid out-of-pocket costs. By June 2000, 50% of persons covered by private hospital insurance had policies with front-end deductibles compared with 5% in 1989 (PHIAC 2000 Figure 25 ), and there has been a further increase to 59% by June 03. This is a logical response to the set of policies used to promote private health insurance. High-income earners have an incentive to purchase the cheapest (approved) private health insurance policy, typically carrying a high excess, to avoid the 1% tax surcharge, even if they have no intention of using the private hospital system. Researchers at the Australia Institute (Hamilton and Denniss 2002) estimate that 735,000 people have taken out PHI simply, or primarily, to avoid paying the tax surcharge. Regardless of income levels, insured persons may choose to use public hospitals, or may need to use public hospitals, for clinical or preference reasons as well as to avoid out-of-pocket costs.
• Secondly, most of the new members recruited in response to the package of PHI incentives were young.
Comparing PHI membership at June 2000 with June 1998, there were an extra 2.45 million persons under 65 years of age, but only 60,000 additional members aged 65 or older. Persons under 65 tend not to be large users of public hospital services, at 0.6 mean bed days per head (in 1997-8), compared with 3.8 mean bed days per head for persons 65+ (AIHW 2002A, Tables S32, A1 ). Encouraging young people to take out PHI cannot be expected to take pressure off the public hospital sector, as they are not big users of public hospitals.
The continuing rise in public hospital expenditure also suggests the policy has been ineffective at redirecting demand from public to private hospitals. Between 1998-99 and 2000-01, the use of private hospitals increased by $490 million (constant prices) from $4,049 million to $4,539 million (AIHW 2002b), while over the same period public hospital expenditure increased by $740 million (constant prices), from $14,114 to $14,854 million. The growth rate in public hospital expenditure, at 2.6%/annum, was similar to that for the decade 1990-91 to 2000-01 at 2.9%/annum. (Later data suggests there may have been a one off slow down in the rate of growth in public hospital expenditure, but with a return by 2001-02 to previous levels, AIHW 2003, Table 15 ).
Furthermore, any increase in demand for private hospital services will mean greater competition for medical specialists and experienced nursing staff, which in the context of a tight labour market may reduce the capacity of public hospitals to meet the needs of public patients. Private hospitals also have an incentive to seek the more profitable cases potentially increasing the complexity of cases left in the public hospitals. In this way an increase in the level of private insurance may increase rather than reduce the pressure on public hospitals.
Choice of insurer/choice of health service
The second principal argument used to justify government support for private health insurance is to provide citizens with choice of insurer and support 'a viable private health industry to improve choice of health services for Australians' (This objective is enunciated in the Budget Papers 2002, Health and Ageing Portfolio statement of mission and outcomes, Commonwealth of Australia, 2002). There are several elements to this argument: firstly, that consumers value choice of insurer, or that choice of insurer is central to choice of provider which they do value; secondly that the policies have improved affordability (worsening affordability at least partly reflected a worsening risk profile, as young people dropped out of, or did not take up, PHI), and finally that there are net social gains from the policy, not merely a gain to those who take out PHI, equivalent to the cost to the general taxpayer. This is a complex argument, two components of which are briefly considered below.
In relation to a healthy private sector, it can be noted that private health care is funded through a combination of public and private monies. Private medical practice is almost entirely underpinned by public funds. Private hospitals can also be funded through the public purse, through contracts for the provision of health services under Medicare, through privatisation of public hospitals, and directly through payments for services by Veterans Affairs. AIHW (2003) reports average real annual growth in private hospitals over the period 1992/93 to 1997/98 of 2.5% per annum, equivalent to the growth in public hospital expenditure for that period, but with negative growth for 1996-97 and 1997-98 . If the worsening profitability of private hospitals is accepted as a legitimate cause for intervention, it would still need to be established that policies to support PHI are an efficient way to ensure a healthy private hospital sector (and that the particular policies adopted are an efficient means to promote PHI). As there is no unique relationship between ownership of service delivery and funding, private hospitals do not have to be underpinned by increasing PHI. In 1997-8, 21% of expenditure on private hospitals was from public sources, increasing to 35% in 2001-02, (AIHW 2003, Table 13 &14) .
Finally, with respect to affordability, despite the major change in the age profile of PHI membership, through a large influx of young members, the promised fall in premiums has not occurred. Rather premiums continue to rise, invoking an ever-increasing government subsidy. .
Commonwealth and private contribution to health care costs
The third argument for supporting private health insurance concerns the size of the Commonwealth government funding commitment under Medicare, and a perceived need to bring additional private monies into the health system.
The evidence shows two things. Firstly, that between 1991-2 and 1996-7, despite the fall in PHI membership, the Commonwealth and total government share of health expenditure changed relatively little, and could not be depicted as an out of control upward spiral (see Table 3 ). Secondly, while the PHI contribution to total health care expenditure was falling over this period, from 11.5% in 1991-92 to 10.4% in 1996-7, the policies seem to be a disproportionate response to the drop of 1.1% point.. Contrary to the stated objective, the introduction of the limited rebate on PHI membership in 1997 and its extension to all memberships from Dec 31 1998 resulted in a further fall in PHI as a source of funding of health services (net of the Commonwealth contribution), to 6.5% in 1999-2000. It has since recovered somewhat, with the large increase in PHI membership, to 7.6% of health expenditure in 2001-02. At the same time, the Commonwealth share of the health budget has increased following the PHI initiatives, to over 46% in each year between 1998-99 and 2001-02, levels seen only once in the preceding 40 years (AIHW 2000, Table 5 .2, p235). The policies to support PHI have not brought additional private monies into the health sector, but have had the opposite effect, placing greater demands on the Commonwealth. If the system was not sustainable before, in terms of the level of government contribution, the current policies have made it worse in this regard, not better. 
Efficiency of the current policies as a means to promote PHI
Regardless of the arguments about the social benefit of increasing PHI membership, it is unequivocally the case that if PHI is to be promoted by government, it should be done in the most efficient manner.
The major component of cost, the unlimited non-means-tested 30% rebate on all PHI policies did not stimulate a large increase in PHI membership, which rather occurred in response to the change in lifetime rating and the publicity campaign promoting PHI membership. An estimated $1,500 million of the rebate was paid to the 5.7 million members who already had PHI, in relation to whom the only possible impact is an improvement in membership retention. The pattern of benefit payments suggests that only 54% of the rebate goes towards additional hospital services, with some 26% on extras and,14% for management expenses and the like. See Table 4 . Figure 12 , Table 2 Notes:
* the major increase in prosthesis payments has been due to price increases, (nominally 50% of prosthesis payments allocated as a transfer payment) # numbers do not balance due to other income and changes in equity
Equity
The various incentives to promote private health insurance provide disproportionate benefit to those on higher incomes. Persons on high incomes are more likely to take out PHI and thus receive the rebate on the cost of PHI. The most recent ABS survey of PHI in 1998 estimated that 76% of persons with an income above $100,000 had private health insurance, while only 20% of persons with an income of < $ 20,000 had insurance, with a gradient across the entire income range (ABS 1998). The situation is likely to have become more extreme since, with the combination of the Medicare levy surcharge and the rebate increasing the financial incentive for high income earners to take out PHI. Research by Smith also demonstrates the regressive nature of the PHI rebate. She reports that an estimated 50% of the subsidy would accrue to those in the top quintile in 1998-99 compared with 4% in the bottom quintile. She also shows the policy is considerably more regressive than the means-tested dollar-limited rebate it replaced (Smith 2001) .
Persons with PHI, disproportionately those on higher incomes, get taxpayer support for access to private hospitals and a range of community-based services. In 2002-03, the Commonwealth contributed $711 million towards the latter through the PHI rebate on ancillary cover (30% of contribution income received by private insurers is for Ancillary cover, PHIAC 2003b, Table 2 ). The largest categories of benefit payments in 2002-03 were for dental at $977 million, optical $312 million, physiotherapy $144million, chiropractic services $139 million, pharmacy $75 million, fitness and lifestyle equipment $66 million and podiatry at $50 million (see Table 5 ). Through the 30% rebate, the taxpayer in effect contributes 30% of the cost of these services.
While a subsidy on some community-based health services might be desirable, to tie that subsidy to the purchase of private health insurance, rather than to relevant clinical or health economic criteria is questionable on both efficiency and equity grounds. It is interesting to note that some service types, central to clinical care, such as speech therapy, occupational therapy and dietetics attracted less than $5million subsidy (total across all 3 areas) in 2002-03, while 'natural therapies' in effect received a taxpayer subsidy of $10 million (see Table 5 ).
The inequity of current arrangements is well illustrated by the Commonwealth government subsidy on dental services. Through the rebate on ancillary cover, the Commonwealth in effect contributed in 2002-03 $293 million (30% of $977 million) to private dental services, largely for those on higher incomes. At the same time Commonwealth financial support has been withdrawn from the public dental scheme, which offers dental care to low income Australians, arguing that dental care is not a Commonwealth responsibility.
In short, the policies to support PHI use taxation revenue to assist those predominantly on higher incomes to gain priority access to elective surgery and other health services. There is no mechanism to ensure that the subsidy is directed to those with the greatest clinical need. This is inefficient as well as inequitable (Smith 2000 , Willcox 2001 , Deeble 2003 and at odds with one of the stated government goals of 'improved life expectancy and infant mortality for low income Australians, so that they are comparable with the general population' (Commonwealth of Australia, 2002) . Hall and colleagues (1999) conclude that the Australian system of subsidies and penalties to promote private health insurance 'leads to greater inequity in access to health care,' (p 659). 
Health system costs
Promotion of private health insurance is likely to increase health system costs, through increased demand (driven by a combination of consumers wanting to 'use' their insurance -the phenomenon of moral hazard and providers recommending a higher level of servicing -the phenomenon of supplier induced demand). But in addition, systems with a high private insurance component tend to exhibit higher cost/price structures. The increase in the unit cost of prostheses and of medical payments above the schedule fee, and the acceleration in the rate of increase in health expenditure as a percent of GDP in Australia (which has accompanied the increase in PHI membership), suggest reasons for concern. Anderson and colleagues (2003) , in an analysis of health care spending in 30 OECD countries, which seeks to explain the reason for higher health care spending in the USA, conclude that it is essentially due to higher prices (including fees) and costs. The higher costs they argue are due at least in part to a fragmented health care system in which providers wield market power, compared with other countries in which government funders and purchasers dominate and are able to exercise greater control over costs and prices.
The fact that health systems with a high proportion of private funding tend to be more expensive, with no evidence of improved health outcomes, is not coincidental, but reflective of certain cost-inflating aspects of private funding. Duckett and Jackson (2000) in their analysis of the health insurance rebate, estimate that public hospitals are 10% more efficient than private hospitals, given an appropriate adjustment for differential case mix. In the right regulatory environment, a single insurer is the most efficient way of providing insurance, due to the capacity to spread risk and minimise administrative and management costs. The costs of management under Medicare are estimated at 3.2% of recurrent health care expenditure compared with 13.8% for the Private Health Funds (AIHW 2002b, Table A9 ). In addition, many private health funds must achieve a profit.
While one of the arguments for supporting private health insurance was to contain costs, or at least the Commonwealth contribution to health care, we find that both total health care expenditures and the Commonwealth share of funding have risen with increasing PHI membership. By 2001-02 health expenditure was 9.3% of GDP following a rise of 0.6% points over the 3 years post 1998-99, twice the increase of the previous 3 years (of 0.3% points). Commonwealth health care spending has risen from 3.7% of GDP in 1996-97 to 4.3% of GDP in 2001-02. The continuing increase in PHI premiums, in the face of a vastly improved risk profile of health insurance funds, is further evidence of the cost inflating effect of PHI.
The perverse incentives of a partial system
The current PHI policies also support the perverse incentives contained in a partial (that is non-comprehensive) health insurance model. There is no requirement on the private health system to offer a fully self-contained health service. In fact the opposite is the case. As insured persons retain full entitlements under Medicare, private insurers and private providers need not cover the full range of health care needs, but can choose to focus on the more profitable health services. As noted by Deeble 2003 , 'nearly all emergencies and most of the oldest, poorest and sickest patients will be cared for publicly' (p9), while the private hospital system focuses on elective surgery, and within that, the more profitable area of day surgery 1 . In 2001-02, private hospitals in Victoria accounted for 53% of all elective surgery cases, but 24% of all hospital expenditure (Hanning 2002) . Furthermore, with more intensive care beds and employment of full time medical staff, public hospitals are likely to attract more complex cases, both as elective admissions and through emergency transfer from private hospitals following a serious adverse event.
Policy Implications
This paper has drawn on a wide range of evidence which, when taken together provides a compelling case for a total overhaul of policies relating to private health insurance. Current arrangements are seen to undermine the efficiency and equity of the Australian health care system, and increase the overall cost of health care and cost to the Commonwealth, while reducing the contribution by the overall private health insurance industry. It has provided greatest subsidies to those on higher incomes and improved their access to private hospital and other health services, in a way that is unrelated to clinical need.
Universal coverage is now the accepted standard across the 'developed' world, with 'the US the only major industrialised nation not to provide health coverage for all' (Davis and Cooper 2003 p3) .
The existence of universal coverage changes radically the function of private health insurance, however, this change is not yet reflected in policy. Rather, a set of policies exist to support PHI, that seem to have more relevance to a two health tiered system in which public health care is not for all, but targeted at 'disadvantaged groups'. The evidence is clear that current policies to promote PHI, which are offered alongside a universal health insurance system, make the health care market less rather than more efficient and less rather than more equitable. The open-ended funding support for private health insurance through the 30% rebate means that the distortions are not only costly, but are not self-limiting and have the potential to reduce funds available in other areas, such as public hospitals.
